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NOTES 
The BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits: 
of "Duties of the Job" 
The Scope 
Typically statutory, the words "reasonably necessary to the normal op-
eration of its business," are not normally of the variety that suggest hand-
wringing, earth-shaking, heart-rendering decisions of great moment. 
Words can be deceiving though .... 1 
Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (ADEA)2 in response to the President's and the public's disap-
proval of employment practices that correlate age with ability.3 In 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 4 the Supreme Court described the findings of the 
Secretary of Labor in support of the ADEA: "Although age discrimi-
nation rarely was based on the sort of animus motivating some other 
forms of discrimination, it was based in large part on stereotypes un-
supported by objective fact, and was often defended on grounds differ-
ent from its actual causes."5 The ADEA makes it illegal for an 
employer to discriminate on the basis of age in hiring, firing, or terms 
of employment;6 or "to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as 
an employee, because of such individual's age."7 Congress amended 
the ADEA in 1974 to extend protection to employees of state and 
local governments,8 in 1978 to extend coverage to federal employees 
and to persons from age forty through sixty-nine,9 and in 1986 to ex-
1. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 226 (5th Cir. 1976) (interpreting the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act in a case where a job applicant was denied consideration 
based on age). 
2. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & 
Supp. II 1984)). 
3. See 113 CONG. REc. 34,743-44 (1967) (quoting President Johnson's Older American 
Message to Congress of Jan. 23, 1967). 
4. 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
5. 460 U.S. at 231. The ADEA states: "It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to pro· 
mote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 62l(b) (1982). 
6. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l) (1982). 
7. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2) (1982). 
8. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 55, 
74 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1982)). 
9. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendment of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 
92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a)-(b) (1982)). Prior to the 1978 amendments, the 
ADEA covered persons from age 40 through age 64. The statute was slightly modified again in 
1982 and 1984. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 
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tend coverage to most employees over age 40, no matter how old.10 
The ADEA provides a defense to a plaintiff's claim of age discrim-
ination through an age-based employment decision "where age is a 
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the nor-
mal operation of the particular business." 11 In its recent Western Air 
Lines v. Criswell decision, 12 the Supreme Court adopted the test of 
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours 13 as the standard a defendant-employer 
must meet in order to show that it has a valid bona fide occupational 
qualification (BFOQ) defense. 14 Under Criswell and Tamiami the de-
353 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(g) (1982)) (adjusting requirements for health plan coverage for 
workers aged 65 to 69); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 1063 (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 623(g)(l) (Supp. II 1984)) (extending entitlement to coverage under group 
health plan to employees' spouses aged 65-69); Older Americans Act Amendments of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-459, 98 Stat. 1792 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(g) (Supp. II 1984)) (extending ADEA 
requirements to citizens working in foreign countries). 
10. Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 
3342. The 1986 Amendments remove the age ceiling for applicability of the ADEA for all em-
ployers except excecutives or people in a high policymaking position (§ 2), faculty of colleges and 
universities (§ 6), and firefighters and law enforcement officers (§ 3). The 1986 Amendments 
temporarily suspend the ADEA protections for state employed firefighters and law enforcement 
officers for seven years during which time the EEOC and Department of Labor shall jointly 
study mental and physical fitness tests to determine whether they are valid measurements of 
ability and competency(§ 3(b) and § 5(a)). The study must be completed within four years at 
which time the Secretary of Labor and the EEOC will submit to Congress a report and recom-
mendations (§ 5(a)). The seven-year suspension will not affect age discrimination claims already 
in progress (§ 7(b)). 
The 1986 Amendments do not affect the developing case law discussed in this Note to the 
extent that it applies to: (1) private sector employees engaged in jobs affecting public safety (such 
as bus drivers), (2) pending police and firefighter cases, and (3) the cases that will arise after 
December 31, 1993. 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (1982) (emphasis added). 
The defense may be asserted by an employer after a plaintiff-employee shows age discrimina-
tion. This procedure is analogous to that used in litigation under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964 which promotes anti-discrimination principles with respect to race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin. The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) language in the ADEA 
is borrowed from Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1982). In Title VII cases, the Supreme 
Court has placed the burden on the plaintiff to make a prima facie case by establishing discrimi-
nation forbidden by the Act. The burden of proof then shifts to the defendant-employer to show 
a valid BFOQ defense to the discrimination or rebut the prima facie case. See McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). For a description of the relationship between 
defenses and burdens of proof in Title VII cases and those under the ADEA, see Schickman, The 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the McDonnell Douglas Formula in Jury Actions Under the ADEA, 
32 HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1981). 
12. 472 U.S. 400 (1985). In Criswell, the Court ruled that the mandatory retirement age of 
60 for flight engineers and the denial of reassignment of pilots aged 60 or over to flight engineer-
ing positions violated the ADEA. 
13. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). 
14. The test competing with Tamiami was devised in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 
859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). Hodgson held that a bus company's 
maximum hiring age for drivers met the BFOQ exception because the company was able to 
demonstrate a "rational basis in fact to believe that elimination of its maximum hiring age 
[would] increase the likelihood of risk of harm to its passengers." 499 F.2d at 863. 
The Tamiami test was proposed in a situation identical to Hodgson. The Tamiami court 
found that the bus company's maximum hiring age policy for its drivers was lawful even though 
the Court's test was more stringent. 
Other courts of appeals overwhelmingly have applied the Tamiami test. See Criswell, 472 
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fendant-employer must show first that the qualification is reasonably 
necessary to the essential operation of the business, 15 and second, that 
there is a factual basis to believe that substantially all persons over the 
age established would be unable to perform safely or efficiently the 
duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal 
with persons over the age on an individual basis.16 Lower courts re-
main divided over how broadly to define the scope of inquiry into the 
job characteristics (the "duties of the job") of an employee against 
whom the BFOQ defense is asserted.17 
Three courts of appeals have addressed this question directly. The 
Seventh Circuit has held that a court may look only at the characteris-
tics of the generic class of employees when considering whether age is 
a BFOQ under the ADEA.18 The Eighth Circuit requires an examina-
U.S. 400, 416 (1985) (citing cases); see also EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 
447 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding maximum hiring age of 32 for radio operators and state highway 
patrol members, and mandatory retirement age of 60 for patrol members as BFOQs because no 
substitute for an age test could adequately screen employees or candidates for employment), cert. 
denied, 106 S.Ct. 88 (1985); Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dept., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983) 
(mandatory retirement age of 55 for assistant fire chief not a BFOQ because the city did not need 
to rely on age as a proxy for job qualifications}, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 (1983). See Rosen· 
blum, Age Discrimination in Employment and the Permissibility of Occupational Age Restrictions, 
32 HAsTINGs L.J. 1261, 1266-67 (1981), and Schickman, supra note 11, at 1252-54, for general 
applicability of the BFOQ defense. 
15. Tamiami, 531 F.2d at 235. Specifically, in Tamiami the employer was required to have a 
rational basis for believing that an age-based decision was necessary to prevent its operations 
from resulting in the diminution of public safety. 
16. 531 F.2d at 236. The court derived the two-part test from two other Fifth Circuit cases 
challenging sex discrimination under Title VII. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 228 
(5th Cir. 1969) (employer's refusal to hire a woman as "switchman" because of the strenuous 
nature of the job was based on stereotyped characterizations); Diaz v. Pan American World 
Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.) (employer's refusal to hire men as flight attendants based on a 
mere business convenience}, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971). Diaz established as a threshold 
requirement for a BFOQ defense under Title VII that the employer's decision be reasonably 
necessary to the essence of the business. 442 F.2d at 388. Weeks required that the employer 
asserting a Title VII BFOQ defense have a "factual basis for believing •.• that all or substantially 
all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved." 408 
F.2d at 235. Although these cases interpret Title VII and not the ADEA, the statutocy language 
and legislative histories of the two anti-discrimination laws are related and therefore suggest use 
of the same test. See note 11 supra. 
17. Compare Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1983}, revd., 738 F.2d 35 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. 
Minn. 1980), ajfd., 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982); and EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 
1375 (W.D. Wis. 1974), revd., 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980), discussed in Part I infra. See 
Rosenblum, supra note 14 at 1270-71 (1981); Note, The Scope of the Bona Fide Occupational 
Qualification Exception Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: EEOC v. Janesville, 
57 CHI. KENT L. REV. 1145 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Scope of the BFOQ]; Note, Striking a 
Balance Between the Interests of Public Safety and the Rights of Older Workers: The Age BFOQ 
Defense, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1371 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Striking a Balance]; Recent 
Development, The Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception - Clarifying the Meaning of 
"Occupational Qualification," 38 VAND. L. REV. 1345 (1985) [hereinafter Recent Development, 
Clarifying the Meaning]; see also Comment, A New Interpretation of the BFOQ Exception Under 
the ADEA: A Remedy for the Exception That Swallowed the Rule, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 391 
(1982). 
18. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980). 
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tion of the specific duties performed by the individual employee to de-
termine whether age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal 
operation of the particular business. 19 The First Circuit's standard lies 
between that of the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, and requires courts 
to look to discrete "vocations" within the business. 20 
This Note examines these three possible interpretations of which 
job characteristics a court must examine when determining the valid-
ity of a BFOQ defense to an ADEA suit and concludes that the Eighth 
Circuit's standard is correct. Because disputes over which interpreta-
tion is proper arise almost exclusively in cases involving public safety 
occupations,21 this Note discusses the standards for measuring that 
scope within the framework of the policy considerations associated 
with public safety. Part I of this Note discusses the three current stan-
dards used to determine the scope of the BFOQ defense. Part II il-
luminates the problems inherent in having three different standards 
and argues that a single standard most fully effectuates the goals of the 
ADEA. Furthermore, Part II argues that in light of the statutory lan-
guage, legislative history, and policy concerns behind the ADEA, 
courts should follow the Eighth Circuit and define "duties of the job" 
to mean the specific duties performed by the employee. 
I. JOB CHARACTERISTICS EXAMINED: THREE STANDARDS 
The definition of "the duties of the job" in the Criswell-Tamiami 
test for the BFOQ defense is extremely important to litigants under 
the ADEA. The court's choice of how broadly to define the em-
ployee's job duties determined the outcome of each of the three appel-
late decisions that directly addressed this issue. This section briefly 
describes the facts and reasoning of these three cases. 
A. EEOC v. City of Janesville 
In 1980, the Seventh Circuit became the first court of appeals to 
ask which job characteristics a court must examine under the BFOQ 
defense. In EEOC v. City of Janesville, 22 the chief of police of Janes-
19. EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162, 1165-66 (8th Cir. 1982). 
20. Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 39 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). 
21. See Rosenblum, supra note 14, at 1269 ("ADEA litigation involving age as a BFOQ in 
both hiring and mandatory retirement has focused primarily on three occupations: police of-
ficers, firefighters, and airline pilots."); Note, Striking a Balance, supra note 17, at 1374-75 
("[T]he interests of public safety [are] found in nearly all the litigated BFOQ cases."); Recent 
Development, Clarifying the Meaning, supra note 17, at 1346 n.6 ("Thus far, courts have ad-
dressed this problem only in cases concerning protective service employees - law enforcement 
personnel and firefighters."). The author has not found reference to any hiring or mandatory 
retirement case involving the ADEA's BFOQ defense that did not also involve public safety. 
22. 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980). Because Janesville was decided before the Supreme Court 
adopted the standard set forth in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531F.2d224 (5th Cir. 1976), in 
Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985), the court chose to follow Hodgson v. Grey-
hound Lines, 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). However, the 
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ville, Wisconsin claimed that the city violated the ADEA when it dis-
charged him, pursuant to city policy, nine days after his fifty-fifth 
birthday. 23 The city described his job at trial as "responsible adminis-
trative work directing all activities and employees of the City Police 
Department."24 The job description for the position required knowl-
edge of police regulations, organization, management, and evaluation 
standards; an ability to communicate, supervise, and command re-
spect; and good physical health. 2s 
In reversing the district court, 26 the court of appeals held that the 
"plain meaning" of the ADEA mandated a broad examination of the 
primary function of the particular business - law enforcement. 27 The 
court deferred to the state legislature's statutory presumption that age 
is legitimately related to an employee's ability to perform the general 
business of law enforcement. Consequently, the court upheld the 
mandatory retirement age for the Police Chief, without reference to 
whether age was a BFOQ for his position. The court conceded that the 
BFOQ exception should be construed narrowly, given Congress' intent 
that the ADEA would prohibit discrimination, but maintained that its 
own interpretation was narrow enough. The court indicated that con-
siderations of public safety expand the otherwise narrow BFOQ de-
fense. The court preferred to err on the side of caution by ensuring 
that all law enforcement personnel were fit to perform all jobs in that 
"business." Because the court decided it had no expertise to judge 
how high that standard of fitness should be, it deferred to the state's 
scope of examination employed by the court was based entirely on statutory language and not on 
a judicial test. "Nor do we find reliance on our decision in Hodgson ••• dispositive •.•. " 630 
F.2d at 1258. 
23. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1376-77 (W.D. Wis. 1979), revd., 630 
F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (reversing order granting preliminary injunction to reinstate the Chief 
of Police). City policy, which was based on state law, WIS. STAT. ANN.§§ 41.02(23), 41.11(1) 
(West 1979), required protective service employees to retire at the end of the calendar quarter in 
which they turned 55. The statute defined a protective service employee as "any participant 
whose principal duties involve active law enforcement or active fire suppression or prevention, 
provided such duties require frequent exposure to a high degree of danger or peril and also 
require a high degree of physical conditioning." WIS. STAT. ANN. § 41.02(ll)(a) (West 1979). 
Despite its frequent-exposure requirement, the statute specifically includes all policemen includ-
ing the chief. WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 41.02(1 l)(a) (West 1979). The city policy contained provisions 
to permit an employee to work an extra year after age 55 under certain hardship circumstances. 
The City argued that the legislature's judgment defined the public interest and established a valid 
BFOQ; therefore, the city did no studies to obtain empirical data supporting its policy. 480 F. 
Supp. at 1377. 
24. 480 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (W.D. Wis. 1979), revd., 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980). 
25. 480 F. Supp. at 1377. 
26. The district court found that the BFOQ review requires examination of the duties of the 
individual employee. The district court ordered a preliminary injunction reinstating the plaintiff 
pending a full trial because (1) there was a reasonable likelihood that the City would not estab-
lish, at trial, a relationship between age and the qualifications required of the police chief, and 
(2) the irreparable hardship plaintiff would suffer by staying away from the job until trial out-
weighed the possible disruption to the department by reinstating him. 480 F. Supp. at 1380. 
27. 630 F.2d at 1258. See text at note 54 infra. 
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determination as implemented by the city.2s 
B. EEOC v. City of St. Paul 
In 1982, the Eighth Circuit in EEOC v. City of St. Pau/29 endorsed 
reasoning in direct conflict with that of Janesville. In St. Paul, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) intervened on 
behalf of a district fire chief forced to retire, pursuant to a city ordi-
nance, at age sixty-five. 30 The St. Paul fire department provides 
firefighting, paramedic, and rescue services for the city. Age is rele-
vant to an individual's ability to perform these services, which require 
physical stamina. Thus, under the Janesville standard, the city could 
have required its district chief to retire at age sixty-five. The district 
court, however, examined the characteristics of the chief's particular 
assignments in the fire department and found that age was a BFOQ for 
captains and firefighters but not for district chiefs.31 Many of the fire 
captains' and firefighters' duties involved the physically strenuous 
tasks of combatting fires and saving lives, 32 whereas the district chief 
was primarily responsible for supervision, discipline, communication, 
and training. His duties at a fire generally involved command and 
management responsibilities. Occasionally, however, the district chief 
performed physically demanding work at a fire since he would enter a 
burning building if necessary to save lives. 33 The district chief (as well 
as captains and firefighters) performed his duties during a twenty-four 
hour shift, more demanding than a standard eight-hour work day. 
Recognizing that different readings of the BFOQ exception are 
possible, the Eighth Circuit stressed the importance of the legislative 
history of the ADEA and the Act's goal of eliminating age discrimina-
28. 630 F.2d at 1258-59. 
29. EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982), afjg. 500 F. Supp. 1135 (D. 
Minn. 1980). 
30. The city ordinance was an application of state law. The pattern is similar to that in 
Janesville: a state law required the retirement at age 65 of all employees or officers of police or 
fire departments who participated in the state pension scheme. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 423.075 
(West 1958) (amended 1981); see St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. at 1137. 
31. St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. at 1142-43. 
32. The fire department hierarchy of uniformed officers is capped with a fire chief and his 
two assistant chiefs, followed by district chiefs, deputy chiefs, captains, and, finally, the firefight-
ers. 500 F. Supp. at 1138. 
33. 500 F. Supp. at 1139. EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1982), 
closely followed the lead of St. Paul in an analogous case which held that police department 
captains cannot be forced to retire at age 65. Like district chiefs in the St. Paul fire department, 
captains in the Minneapolis police department have primarily supervisory responsibilities. 
Although there are no medical or physical requirements for the position of police captain, he 
sometimes fills a "command" role in "street situations." 537 F. Supp. at 752-53. Like any police 
officer, when a captain observes a crime, he is obligated to respond. The court held that the 
BFOQ defense required the court to examine the specific duties of the supervisory captain. 537 
F. Supp. at 756. Minneapolis is a municipal police case similar to Janesville except that it may 
present an even stronger case for a BFOQ if the position of police captain requires more physical 
exertion than the position of police chief. 
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tion based on broad stereotyping across occupations within a busi-
ness. 34 The court noted that forcing a district chief fully able to meet 
the demands of his position to retire solely because he is unable to 
fu1fi11 the duties of other positions is inconsistent with the thrust of the 
ADEA.35 The court stated, "We cannot believe that the ADEA was 
intended to allow a city to retire a police dispatcher because that per-
son is too old to serve on a SWAT team."36 
C. Mahoney v. Trabucco 
Like Janesville and St. Paul, Mahoney v. Trabucco 37 involved a 
challenge to a statute setting a mandatory retirement age for certain 
public service employees.38 The plaintiff, Sergeant Mahoney, was in 
the uniformed branch of the Massachusetts state police, where he held 
a desk job as a telecommunication specialist. In contrast to Mahoney, 
most sergeants in the state police were assigned strenuous road duties. 
The state forced Mahoney, like all members of the state police, to re-
tire at age fifty. Mahoney had a continuing, although rarely exercised, 
duty to aid citizens on state highways,39 and was subject to transfer to 
another assignment that might involve demanding road work or emer-
gency duty.40 
The district court determined that these facts were insufficient to 
make out a proper BFOQ defense under the Criswell-Tamiami test.41 
The court reasoned, as in St. Paul, that the "duties of the job" should 
be defined as the daily duties of Mahoney and concluded that the pos-
sibility of his transfer or involvement in a strenuous highway-aid situa-
tion was remote and speculative.42 
The First Circuit reversed the district court and held that in this 
context "duties of the job" refers to duties of each discrete rank or 
34. St. Paul 671 F.2d at 1165, 1167 (citing H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., re· 
printed in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213, 2214; H.R. REP. No. 913, 93d Cong., 
2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2811, 2850; 120 CONG. REC. 
8768 (1974)). 
35. 671 F.2d at 1165. 
36. 671 F.2d at 1166. See notes 87-91 infra and accompanying text for discussion of this 
issue. 
37. 574 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1983), revd., 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1036 (1984); see also EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986). 
38. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (Law. Co-op. 1983). 
39. Mahoney, 574 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D. Mass. 1983). 
40. 574 F. Supp. at 959. 
41. The trial court quoted EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983), stating that the 
ADEA requires states to make retirement rules "in a more individualized and careful man· 
ner .... " 574 F. Supp. at 961. 
42. 574 F. Supp. at 962. This is similar to the position taken by the court deciding EEOC v. 
City of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Minn. 1982). See note 33 supra. Mahoney's 
prior transfers did not involve physically demanding work. During emergencies, his responsibili· 
ties involved telecommunication duties. 
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"vocation" within the state police organization.43 The court did not 
examine variations in duties within ranks. Rather, the court looked at 
the duties of all officers in the rank or occupational category. The 
court described this approach as a middle ground between the ap-
proaches of the Janesville and St. Paul courts.44 
The court asserted that because all officers in a paramilitary force 
such as the state police are subject to reassignment to strenuous duty 
in an emergency, an officer's "occupation" (in the BFOQ sense) is his 
rank, and not his temporary or permanent assignment.45 The court 
noted further that the district court's analysis would have impaired the 
operation of the state police by making staffing options less flexible and 
by prompting older officers to demand less strenuous assignments.46 
The Mahoney court, however, recognized some of the limitations 
43. 738 F.2d at 39. 
44. On a more general level, the Mahoney approach examines each level of the personnel 
pyramid by hierarchical rank while Janesville would examine the characteristics of the entire 
personnel pyramid and St. Paul would examine the duties of each officer. See notes 52-55 infra 
and accompanying text. 
In EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985), the Third Circuit announced its 
adoption of the Mahoney approach to the BFOQ defense. The plaintiff in this case was a state 
police officer who was forced to retire at age 60 pursuant to 71 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 65(d) 
(Purdon Supp. 1986). The court ruled that it would not look at the "relatively sedentary admin-
istrative assignments" held by individual members of the force. 768 F.2d at 517. Rather, the 
court would look to the "occupation" of state police officers which includes some duties of the 
active trooper. It is important to note that although the court claimed to be applying the Maho-
ney standard of scope of the duties of the job, it did not discuss distinctions between ranks; its 
language was as similar to Janesville as it was to Mahoney. On remand, the district court made 
particularized findings to show that age is a BFOQ for state police generally. 645 F. Supp. 1545 
(M.D. Pa. 1986). 
45. The court ascribed meaning to the term "occupational qualification" as distinct from 
"particular business" in the BFOQ passage: "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (1982). The 
court defined "occupation" to mean a recognized and discrete "vocation" broader than a particu-
lar assignment. 
The court gives an example of another application of its definition in the commercial airline 
business. It states that there are particular occupations within the business, such as captain, first 
officer, and flight engineer. 738 F.2d at 39. The application of the Mahoney definition is easier in 
the airline business case because the "ranks" of employees correspond to their duties. A captain 
is the pilot of a plane; the examination of particularized tasks in this application yields the same 
result as the application of the Mahoney standard. 
46. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38; see text at notes 92-96 infra. The Mahoney court expressly 
rejected the St. Paul SWAT team analogy, quoted in text at note 36 supra. The court reasoned 
that fine distinctions between assignments that require different degrees of strenuous activity 
would paralyze a police force. The court described the difficulties of strict application of the St. 
Paul particularistic standard to the Massachusetts state police. It suggested that troopers en-
gaged in tracking down car thieves would have different retirement standards than troopers who 
detected speeders, drunk drivers, and overweight trucks. 738 F.2d at 39. Although this example 
probably exaggerates the St. Paul analysis, as the difference in the levels of physical activity 
required for these tasks is much less than the difference between the physical demands upon a 
dispatcher and a SWAT team member, the supposedly absurd distinctions made in St. Paul are 
no less tenable than are distinctions based on rank. The Mahoney court does not explain why 
horizontal distinctions (among persons in a rank) are less desirable than vertical distinctions 
(between a sergeant who works a desk job and a captain who works a desk job, for example). 
Despite its criticism of the St. Paul reasoning, the Mahoney court would have reached the 
same result. The Mahoney court characterized the district fire chief's job as a "position suffi-
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of its middle standard. It observed that an employer could "sweep 
under one classification of employees many distinct vocations and oc-
cupations for which a low mandatory retirement age would be quite 
unjustified."47 Although application of its standard may not be able to 
remedy all such instances of age discrimination, the court concluded 
that it could prevent "blatant or covert efforts to subvert the 
ADEA."48 
II. THE PARTICULARIZED STANDARD: THE MOST 
APPROPRIATE SCOPE 
A single standard to determine which job duties a court must ex-
amine under a BFOQ defense in the public safety context will provide 
predictability to employers, employees, litigants, and the federal 
courts. Currently, with the exception of Janesville, St. Paul, and Ma-
honey, only two courts have settled on a standard. 49 The standard that 
will be applied in other circuits remains uncertain, even though the 
court's choice is often determinative. 50 The division in interpretation 
ciently distinct to be considered an occupation separate from that of the rest of the department." 
Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 39. 
If treatment of persons within the same rank depended on their assignment, the officers might 
seek the less physically strenuous assignments to avoid forced retirement. See text at notes 101-
02 infra. The court stated that litigation in this area would probably increase as officers sought 
determination of whether their particular assignment was subject to a legal mandatory retirement 
age. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38; see text at notes 101-02 infra. 
47. 738 F.2d at 42. 
48. 738 F.2d at 42; see Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) 
(applying a rationality standard in upholding the Massachusetts state police retirement age of SO 
against an equal protection challenge). 
49. EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 768 F.2d S14 (3d Cir. 198S); EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, S37 
F. Supp. 7SO (D. Minn. 1982). In EEOC v. City of Minneapolis, the city was contemplating 
changes in its law enforcement system that would have resulted in the assumption of more front-
line duty and night/weekend work by the captains. The disruptive schedule of night/weekend 
duty may cause fatigue and stress, which affects an officer's ability to conduct physical tasks. 
The potential change strengthened the city's defense because the exemption of captains from 
mandatory retirement could lock the police department into its current system by diminishing its 
ability to change the duties of officers. In holding that the city did not demonstrate that age was 
a BFOQ, the court found the impact of these possible prospective changes too speculative. S37 
F. Supp. at 7S4. 
SO. In Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 4S3 (E.D. Ark. 1976), the city of Little Rock was found 
to have violated the ADEA by forcing an assistant fire chief and a district chief to retire at the 
age of 62. Like the SL Paul court, the Aaron court determined that age was not a BFOQ for 
these positions by examining the specific duties of the persons in those positions. Unlike the St. 
Paul court, however, the Aaron court did not attempt to justify its approach to the problem. 
Similarly, in Hoefelman v. Conservation Commn. of Missouri, S41 F. Supp. 272 (W.D. Mo. 
1982), ajfd., 718 F.2d 281 (8th Cir. 1983), a state department's policy forbade employees over the 
age of 60 from serving as pilots, and resulted in the plaintiff's reassignment from Chief Aircraft 
Pilot to Equipment Supervisor. The policy was found to fall under the BFOQ exception. 
Although the court did not discuss its categorization of the relevant characteristics to be ex-
amined, it seems to have recognized the difference between the two assignments. The Mahoney 
approach would put a wrinkle in the Hoeft/man reasoning because, for all purposes, the Chief 
Aircraft Pilot and the Equipment Supervisor were simply different assignments in the same rank. 
They both had the same salary, grade, and job benefits. The Mahoney reasoning rigidly applied 
may not have distinguished between the two assignments because they would be considered the 
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among the circuits may encourage extensive litigation on this issue. 
Conflicting standards impede planning for both employees and em-
ployers: an employee nearing a mandatory retirement age may not be 
able to decide whether to litigate, a police or fire organization may 
have difficulty making assignments without knowing how long an em-
ployee can serve in a post, and a state pension system may be destabi-
lized when the assumptions on which it was created are challenged.51 
Employment practices that are legal in some jurisdictions and illegal 
in others make central enforcement and transjurisdiction employment 
planning difficult for private employers. A single standard is also 
more fair because employees and employers in identical situations in 
different circuits will be treated similarly. 
The narrow St. Paul approach is the most appropriate way to de-
termine the "duties of the job" for the Criswell-Tamiami test. Analy-
sis of a particular employee's duties is not only consistent with the 
legislative history of the ADEA, it also best resolves the tension be-
tween the anti-discriminatory purpose of the ADEA and the concern 
for public safety. Other policy considerations also support the choice 
of the particularized examination of an employee's duties as the proper 
BFOQ standard. 
A. Statutory Language 
An examination of the "plain meaning" of the words of the ADEA 
does not resolve the competition among the three theories of which job 
duties a court must examine under the BFOQ test. The cases that 
consider this issue focus on the language "bona fide occupational qual-
ification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular 
business .... " 52 Constructed with modifier upon modifier, the BFOQ 
clause is conducive to many "plain" interpretations. 
same rank and therefore the same occupational class. That is not to argue that the Mahoney 
court would have found age not to be a BFOQ but rather that the Mahoney framework for 
examination of occupational categories is artificial and not always helpful in determining whether 
age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business. 
The Mahoney court discussed the situation of the commercial aviation age BFOQ for pilots 
where there is no conflict between compartmentalizing employees by their vocation and rank. In 
that instance, pilots are clearly in a different class from flight engineers who receive less compen-
sation and fewer benefits. See Mahoney, 574 F. Supp. at 955. 
In EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 555 F. Supp. 97 (W.D. Mo. 1982), ajfd. in part, 
revd. in part, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 88 (1985), the district court 
used a St. Paul particularistic scope to examine the ability of each plaintiff to perform the duties 
of his job. The court did not accept generalized medical testimony. 555 F. Supp. 104-05. The 
court, however, did not discuss the reasons for employing the scope it used and was reversed 
without discussion of scope. The court of appeals' reasoning, however, was consistent with a 
shift in scope to a Janesville test (although Mahoney was cited for support). 
51. Mahoney, 574 F. Supp. at 963 n.2. The Massachusetts pension system for state troopers 
is set up by the same state law that prescribes a mandatory retirement age. MASS. GEN. LA ws 
ANN. ch. 32, § 26(3)(a) (West 1984). 
52. 29 u.s.c. § 623(f)(l) (1982). 
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The St. Paul court chose the most straightforward interpretation of 
the BFOQ language; it read the term "necessary" to modify "qualifica-
tion."53 The focus of the statutory language is on characteristics of the 
employee's job, not the employer's business. The Janesville court, 
however, stressed the connection between "necessary" and "busi-
ness."54 Indeed, the court declined to examine the legislative history 
because it believed the meaning of the statutory language was clear. 
The court first defined the business, then identified the primary func-
tion of that business, and finally determined whether the BFOQ excep-
tion applied to the business. 55 
Either court's reading of the statutory language is plausible.56 The 
ADEA's language simply does not define which job duties a court 
must examine under the BFOQ defense. To determine the meaning of 
the BFOQ language, a court must look both to the statute's legislative 
history and to other provisions in the ADEA, including statements of 
purpose. 
B. The Purpose of the ADEA 
The purpose of the ADEA is to eliminate age stereotyping in em-
ployment. 57 That much is clear. However, a search into the legisla-
tive history of the Act and its amendments fails to yield any definitive 
standard for the scope of judicial examination of job duties under the 
BFOQ exception. 58 Although Congress has not directly addressed the 
53. St. Paul, 611 F.2d at 1165. 
54. Janesville, 630 F.2d at 1258. In this sense, the Janesville district court was more honest 
in recognizing that the BFOQ test could conceivably be interpreted in a number of ways. The 
district court chose what it believed was the most reasonable interpretation in light of congres· 
sional intent. 480 F. Supp. at 1378. 
55. The city used this argument. 480 F. Supp. at 1378-79. 
56. The Mahoney court, 738 F.2d at 4041, did not derive its scope solely from the "plain 
meaning" of the ADEA, but it used the statutory language to develop its scope of examination of 
discrete "vocations." See text at note 45 supra. 
One should be careful not to get carried away with a plain meaning analysis. THE AMER!• 
CAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 908 (1981) defines occupation as 
"[a]n activity that serves as one's regular source of livelihood; profession; vocation." This can be 
contrasted with the second definition listed for business as "[c]ommercial, industrial, or profes· 
sional dealings ..•• " THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
supra, at 180. The interpretation breaks down, however, with the adoption of the first definition 
of business which equates it with occupation. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra, at 180. See Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 39 (court refers to dictionary 
definition of occupation without reference to the definition of business.) The ADEA section con· 
taining definitions, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1982), defines neither occupation nor business. 
57. The purpose as set out in the statute is quoted in note 5 supra. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982). 
See also note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
58. The legislative history did not set out the general standard for determining BFOQs until 
1977. "Congress, in considering the 1978 Amendments, implicitly endorsed the two·part inquiry 
identified ... in the Tamiami case." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 415. Senator Javits explained partially 
through the insertion of portions ofS. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1977), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S. CooE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 513-14, into the Congressional Record that a 
Tamiami-type standard should be used to determine whether age is a BFOQ. 123 CONG. REc. 
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question, most of the legislative history suggests that Congress in-
tended that the ADEA would require an analysis of a plaintiff's par-
ticular job duties under the BFOQ test. 
Congress intended the BFOQ exception to be narrow. In discuss-
ing the exception, a House Report stated that "[t]he committee ... 
expects that age will be a relevant criteria [sic] for only a limited 
number of jobs."59 To be consistent with this intent, a court must not 
examine the job characteristics of the business or the occupation, but 
must consider only the job duties of the individual. 60 A broad applica-
tion of the BFOQ defense that groups many distinct plaintiffs into a 
single category61 would endanger the very goals embodied in the 
ADEA. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission62 promul-
gated regulations, authorized by the ADEA, that specifically mandate 
that the BFOQ "have [a] limited scope and application. [A]s this is an 
exception to the Act it must be narrowly construed."63 This adminis-
trative interpretation runs parallel to congressional intent and is a 
model that the courts should accept. 64 
34,319-20 (1977). The amendment specifically incorporating much of the Tamiami language was 
adopted by the Senate but ultimately deleted because the Conference Committee considered it 
surplusage. 472 U.S. at 415-16. 
59. H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977). Senator Yarborough cited the safe, 
narrow example of the "pilot who flies a plane at many hundreds of miles an hour'' as a situation 
in which age would be a BFOQ. 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967). Yarborough did not suggest at 
what age these pilots might have to retire. See also 123 CONG. REc. 34,318 (1977) (statement of 
Sen. Javits). On the other hand, Senator Williams stated, "For some types of work, for example, 
law enforcement activity, there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employ-
ees above a specified age will be unable to continue performing their duties." 123 CONG. REC. 
34,296 (1977). It is important to note that Williams refers to the nature of the duties (law en-
forcement activity) rather than to the business (the police force). 
60. The Court in Criswell, 472 U.S. at 412 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 
(1977)), found that "[t]he restrictive language of the statute, and the consistent interpretation of 
the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the statute convince us that ... the BFOQ 
exception 'was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition' of 
age discrimination contained in the ADEA." 
61. See H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 26 (1977) (BFOQ described as 
"generally meant to exclude workers in hazardous occupations."); see also H.R. REP. No. 527, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 28 (1977). This statement lends support to the Mahoney or Janes-
ville analysis of examining broad categories of jobs rather than the individual employees; but this 
theme is absent from the rest of the legislative history. 
To take specific language from legislative history as ultimately controlling, however, is un-
wise. When words are used to derive an overriding statutory theme that the writer or speaker 
did not intentionally express, an isolated portion of the legislative history that deals with the 
BFOQ exception may seem to contradict congressional intent. 
62. Prior to 1979, the Department of Labor had responsibility for enforcing the ADEA. 
Department of Labor responsibilities were transferred to the EEOC by Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 
1978, § 2, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807, 92 Stat. 3781, set out in appendix 1 to Title 5, Government 
Organization and Employees, effective Jan. 1, 1979, as provided by section 1-101 of Exec. Order 
No. 12,106, 44 Fed. Reg. 1053 (1978). 
63. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6 (1985). 
64. Courts tend to give a good deal of weight to EEOC regulations but vary as to their 
description of how much. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 
435 U.S. 702, 719 n.36 (1978) (the court will not give "conclusive weight to [an] EEOC guide-
line."); EEOC v. Texas Indus., 782 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Although the EEOC's pro-
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Almost every legislative statement about the purpose of the ADEA 
includes the theme that individuals should be judged by their abilities 
rather than classified through stereotypes. For example, the House 
Report for the 1977 amendments states that the "decline of capabili-
ties experienced with age . . . varies with individuals as to age and 
intensity, varies in importance to particular jobs, and may be compen-
sated for by other attributes which often increase with age, for exam-
ple, experience and judgment."65 The emphasis in these statements is 
on consideration of each particular individual and his or her job. 
In Western Air Lines v. Criswell, the Supreme Court noted the pref-
erence for individual evaluation expressed in the language and legisla-
tive history of the ADEA. 66 Criswell summarizes the legislative 
history by observing that "one empirical fact is repeatedly empha-
sized: the process of psychological and physiological degeneration 
caused by aging varies with each individual. 'The basic research in the 
field of aging has established that there is a wide range of individual 
physical ability regardless of age.' " 67 Criswell also cites the Senate 
Report describing the BFOQ defense: 
For example, in certain types of particularly arduous law enforce-
ment activity, there may be a factual basis for believing that substantially 
all employees above a specified age would be unable to continue to per-
form safely and efficiently the duties of their particular jobs, and it may be 
impossible or impractical to determine through . . . periodic reviews of 
current job performance ... the employees' capacity or ability to con-
tinue to perform . . . safely . . . . 68 
nouncement does not have the effect of law, ... it is entitled to a measure of deference unless 'it 
can be said not to be a reasoned and supportable interpretation of the Act.'") (quoting Whirlpool 
Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11 (1980)); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel., 408 F.2d 228, 
235 (5th Cir. 1969) (EEOC sex discrimination guidelines are "entitled to considerable weight." 
The court cited the Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965), standard of "great deference to the 
interpretation given the statute by the ... agency charged with its administration."). 
65. H.R. REP. No. 527, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 12 (1977). At the close of the introduc-
tion of the original bill, Senator Yarborough concluded: "To sum up, this is a bill to give every 
American the opportunity to be equally considered for employment and promotional opportu· 
nity." 113 CONG. REC. 31,253 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough). 
66. 472 U.S. at 422. The Court, however, did not discuss the issue of how to define "duties of 
the job" and did not mention St. Paul, Janesville, or Mahoney. 
67. 472 U.S. at 409 (quoting U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN 
WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 9 (1965)). It is interesting to note that some 
inconsistency in BFOQ cases has resulted from conflicting medical testimony as to whether phys-
ical examinations can reveal aging effects. The court in Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 
859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), found that medical testing could not 
detect the relevant disabling effects. The Tamiami court agreed with this conclusion in a case 
also involving bus drivers. However, in Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977), the court ruled that medical testing can detect such 
effects in airplane pilots. See Comment, supra note 17, at 407-24; Recent Development, Clarify-
ing the Meaning, supra note 17, at 1351 n.60. 
68. 472 U.S. at 415 (emphasis added) (quoting S. REP. No. 493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 
(1977)), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 513-14). It is important to note 
that this statement differs from the test the Court ultimately adopted which uses the disjunctive 
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This wording suggests that the Senate intended that courts would ana-
lyze employees' particular job duties under the BFOQ defense. 
C. Deference to States 
Interpreting the ADEA to require an examination of each em-
ployee's individual job under the BFOQ defense is consistent with 
principles of federalism. Normally, public safety is the responsibility 
of state governments, which presumably best know how to serve the 
local population. 69 Also, courts generally defer to a state's "employ-
ment relationship with [its] citizens as a tool for pursuing social and 
economic policies."70 The Janesville court emphasized judicial defer-
ence to the state's consideration of public safety as support for its 
broad definition of job duties for the BFOQ defense.71 The court rea-
soned that when a state legislature determines that public safety re-
quires all police and fire department employees to retire at a certain 
age, a court should presume that determination to be valid. 72 
Congress, however, enacted the 1974 amendments to the ADEA73 
precisely to limit states' freedom to establish age requirements for pub-
lic safety personnel. 74 The deference to state legislatures relied on in 
"or" to connect the safe performance of the duties of the job segment with the impracticality 
segment. See text at note 16, supra. 
69. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § IB, at 269 (2d ed. 
1983) (state action based on police power is upheld by the Supreme Court unless it interferes 
with interstate commerce). 
70. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 242 (1983) (Citing National League of Cities v. Usery, 
426 U.S. 833 (1976) (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528 (1985)) but upholding congressional exercise of power. Garcia cites Wyoming favorably; see 
note 74 infra.). The Court, however, has been expanding judicial review of a state's employment 
practices. See generally Note, Application of the Constitutional Privacy Right to Exclusions and 
Dismissals from Public Employment, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1037, 1047-53. The 1986 Amendments to 
the ADEA temporarily suspend restrictions on states for the purposes of hiring and mandating 
retirement of firefighters and police officers. See note 10, supra. 
71. Janesville, 630 F.2d at 1258-59. The court cited a Wisconsin statute which mandated 
retirement of protective service employees at age 55. 630 F.2d at 1259; see note 23 supra. 
72. The burdens of proof described in the Janesville opinion are inconsistent. The Janesville 
court stated that the burden of establishing that the retirement programs falls within the BFOQ 
exception is on the city, yet the court also upheld the presumption that the age requirements set 
by statute for a class of occupations is a valid BFOQ. See EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 
1162, 1166 n.6 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Janesville); see also Mcllvanie v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
6 Pa. Cornrow. 505, 296 A.2d 630 (1972) (holding, inter alia, that because of judicial deference to 
the legislature, a police captain challenging a state statute requiring retirement at age 60 for 
almost all members of the force has the burden to show that age is not a BFOQ). 
73. Pub. L. No. 93-259, sec. 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 630(b) (1985)). 
74. Congress has this authority under the commerce clause. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 
226, 243 (1983). In 1985, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 
(1985), overruled National League of Cities by lowering any constitutional barrier to Congress' 
exercise of its commerce clause power to extend the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act to the states. The Garcia court stated that "[a]ny substantive restraint on the exercise of 
Commerce Clause powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this basic limita-
tion, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible failings in the national political process 
rather than to dictate a 'sacred province of state autonomy.'" Garcia, 469 U.S. at 554 (quoting 
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Janesville thus is inconsistent not only with the purpose of the 1974 
amendments, 75 but also with federal case law upholding Congress' 
power to regulate states' employment practices. The Supreme Court 
considered the question of federalism and the ADEA in EEOC v. Wy-
oming. 76 In Wyoming, the Court upheld the 1974 amendments and 
limited the deference federal courts must show to state and local deter-
minations with respect to public employee retirement policies. Be-
cause the state employees in Wyoming were game wardens, the Court 
did not address directly the state deference issue with regard to public 
safety. Lower courts have interpreted Wyoming as a broad endorse-
ment of the application of the ADEA to state and local protective 
service employees, and have not deferred to state determinations un-
less those determinations are supported by sufficient evidence. 77 The 
court in Mahoney observed that Wyoming stressed "the nature of the 
burden on or interference with state policy constituted by the 
ADEA."78 
In the area of police and fire protection, a court should defer to the 
state's safety goals but must not uphold discriminatory means of 
achieving those goals. 79 Although a retirement and pension system 
that does not consider particular job duties may be more convenient 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 236). The 1974 amendment provisions governing these cases have been 
temporarily suspended by the 1986 amendments. See note 10, supra. 
75. Casenote, EEOC v. City of Janesville: Promoting Age Discrimination - The Exception 
Becomes the Rule, 14 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 904-15 (1981) (arguing that deference to state legis· 
lature defeats the purpose of the ADEA by permitting a broad BFOQ exception to swallow the 
rule); Note, Scope of the BFOQ, supra note 17 (based on deference to the state legislature, a broad 
BFOQ exception undermines the purposes of the ADEA). 
76. 460 U.S. 226 (1983). 
77. No ADEA cases after Wyoming defer to state and local governments. Courts have not 
distinguished the extent of involvement in public safety of game wardens from police officers or 
fire fighters. The courts in the following cases gave no deference to state and local determina· 
tions of age qualifications. EEOC v. City of Altoona, 723 F.2d 4 (3d Cir. 1983) (city decision 
pursuant to state court decree setting a mandatory retirement age for five department members), 
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 
1983) (state policy setting maximum hiring age); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 
(9th Cir. 1983) (city policy setting maximum hiring age for pilots in sheriff's and fire depart· 
ments), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984); EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 
1983) (state statute setting maximum hiring age for police officers); Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 
F. Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (state statute setting maximum hiring age for police officers), 
ajfd., 710 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 F. Supp. 955 (D. Mass. 1983) (state 
statute setting mandatory retirement age for state police), revd., 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984). 
78. 738 F.2d at 41. "Put another way, the Act requires the State to achieve its goals in a 
more individualized and careful manner than would otherwise be the case, but it does not require 
the State to abandon those goals, or to abandon the public policy decisions underlying them." 
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 239. 
79. "[T]he State's discretion to achieve its goals in the way it thinks best is not being ovcrrid· 
den entirely, but is merely being tested against a reasonable federal standard." Wyoming, 460 
U.S. at 240 (emphasis in original). Unlike Wyoming, Janesville permits a means to protect the 
public, even if that means is discriminatory. Janesville cited no authority to justify its broad 
deference to the state legislature. 630 F.2d 1254, 1258-59. 
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for a state to administer, requiring individualized consideration would 
hardly force a state to abandon its public policy objectives. 8° Congress 
may prohibit discrimination against older persons, even if it means 
that the state will find its public safety standards costlier to meet. 81 
One practical reason not to give deference is that legislatures may 
adopt a retirement age as a political compromise rather than as a sci-
entifically established necessity. 82 A political compromise cannot be 
considered a reasonable necessity83 for the protection of the public if it 
is not based on a demonstrable medical rationale. Courts should not 
defer to such choices but must be willing to examine the legislative 
record to determine whether a legislature had a rational basis for its 
retirement determination. In applying a rational basis test (the first 
prong of Criswell-Tamiamz), the court would have to decide whether 
the retirement age was rational with respect to the individual's posi-
tion, his rank, or his occupation. 84 
Furthermore, deference to the state's choices is inconsistent with 
the employer's burden of proof under the BFOQ defense. 85 When a 
public service employee sues his state employer, any deference the 
court gives the state translates into a reduced burden of proof for the 
state. This would increase the difficulty a public employee would have 
in maintaining a case against his employer. It is not in keeping with 
80. Criswell settled the issue of deference to the employer's decision where public safety is a 
concern of a private business. The Court found erroneous jury instructions that prescribed defer-
ence to the employer's "selection of job qualifications for the position of [flight engineer) that are 
reasonable in light of the safety risks." 472 U.S. at 419; see text at notes 93-94 infra. 
81. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-55 (the minimum-wage requirements imposed by Con-
gress and upheld by the Court resulted in greater cost for the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority). The political logrolling process may make additional expenses for states more palat-
able to legislators and also may provide states with revenues from federal grants. See Wyoming, 
460 U.S. at 241 ("[I]ncreased costs, even if they were not largely speculative ... might very well 
be outweighed by a number of other factors ..•. "). 
82. For instance, in Aaron v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453 (E.D. Ark. 1976), the mandatory 
retirement age "arose out of collective bargaining and political agreements ... [and was not 
based on] actual studies or empirical data indicating the relevance of the age 62 to the occupa-
tional requirements as compared with, say, age 65." 414 F. Supp. at 460. 
83. The ADEA requires that a BFOQ be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
the particular business." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (1982 & Supp. II 1984). 
84. If a good-faith judgment, based on a loose fit between the needs of the job and the 
effects of age, were enough to bring a mandatory retirement policy within the shelter of 
section 623(f)(l), the Act would have little bite. Older people in our society are not a 
despised and powerless minority; and mandatory retirement laws, rather than being mani-
festations of vicious, exploitative, or unreasoning prejudice, are for the most part efforts -
crude and arbitrary perhaps but not malicious - to balance the costs of a fixed retirement 
age in sometimes forcing out perfectly fit employees with the benefits in avoiding individual-
ized evaluations of fitness, evaluations both costly for the employer to make and potentially 
humiliating for the individual employee to receive. 
Heiar v. Crawford County, Wis., 746 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1984) (Judge Posner struck 
down a mandatory retirement age for police officers.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985). 
85. See note 11 supra and accompanying text. A defendant state agency has the best evi-
dence of the basis of a retirement (or maximum hiring age) requirement that it imposes. A 
plaintiff, on the other hand, has the best evidence of the duties of his job. 
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the spirit of the ADEA to require a plaintiff to produce medical and 
statistical evidence to show that a mandatory retirement age is 
invalid.s6 
D. Public Safety Concerns 
The strongest argument against analyzing the particular duties of 
an employee is that it endangers public safety. Under the particularis-
tic analysis, a court judges an individual by standards that reflect the 
likelihood that he will be exposed to elements of physical stress.87 The 
difficulty arises in formulating standards that take into account the 
small likelihood of exposure to strenuous activity that occurs in cases 
such as Janesville, St. Paul and Mahoney. Criswell suggests that 
courts should use job descriptions to measure the likelihood that an 
employee will perform strenuous activity.ss That would encourage 
employers to focus on the safety obligations included in each individ-
ual employee's duties. Unfortunately, it might encourage an employer 
to write misleading, over-inclusive job descriptions. 
The narrow analysis must come to terms with the problem of a job 
that involves a very small likelihood of exposure to strenuous activity. 
When an employee's job exposes her to strenuous activity only one 
percent of the time, it is during precisely that one percent of the time 
that we are most concerned for public safety.s9 If the courts were to 
decide that the one percent chance of "active" duty gives rise to the 
same unascertainable physical qualification as a ninety-nine percent 
chance, then in most instances the narrow St. Paul analysis would col-
86. See note 11 supra. 
87. Courts have done this by examining the history of a particular employee's involvement in 
strenuous activities and rejecting speculative probabilities of future involvement. EEOC v. City 
of Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750, 754 (D. Minn. 1982) (court refused to consider, as too specula-
tive, the impact of prospective changes in police department structure that would have caused 
plaintiff captains to assume more strenuous duty); see note 49 supra; Mahoney v. Trabucco, 574 
F. Supp. 955, 962 (D. Mass. 1983), revd., 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 
(1984): 
Commissioner Trabucco testified that he could not of course 'guarantee' that the plaintiff 
would not be reassigned. But the evidence indicates that the possibility of reassignment is 
quite speculative and, in my judgment, the chance that Sergeant Mahoney may be reas-
signed to a job for which age is a BFOQ is, on the evidence presented, of only limited 
importance in determining whether the state has sustained its burden of proof on the BFOQ 
defense. 
88. "When an employer establishes that a job qualification has been carefully formulated to 
respond to documented concerns for public safety, it will not be overly burdensome to persuade a 
trier of fact that the qualification is [a BFOQ]." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419 (rejecting employer's 
argument that age qualifications are reasonable based on the employer's subjective assertion). 
89. In Criswell, the Court ruled that pilots too old to continue in that capacity could become 
flight engineers who do have "critical functions in an emergency situation and, of course, might 
cause considerable disruption in the event of [their] own medical emergency." 105 S. Ct. at 
2747-48. The Court accepted the view, however, that individualized physical examinations were 
sufficient to detect this weakness in older flight attendants. See also St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. at 
1141-42 (finding that age is a BFOQ for captains and firefighters but not for district chiefs who 
occasionally perform the same tasks as captains and firefighters); text at notes 29-33 supra. 
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lapse into a broad Janesville analysis. The resolution of this problem, 
then, may ultimately determine the scope of the BFOQ test and the 
outcome of the case. 90 
A modified St. Paul standard that focuses on an individual's duties 
but grants employers flexibility in asserting a BFOQ defense where 
they can show, based on prior practice, that there is a small but more 
than speculative chance that the particular employee will be called on 
to perform strenuous duties, would mitigate this shortcoming.91 Such 
flexibility would not broaden the judicial definition of the job charac-
teristics; the "duties of the job" would still be measured by the individ-
ual's own job. Rather, it would allow employers who could justify age 
discriminatory policies to retain a safe personnel structure. 
Another common expression of the public safety concern focuses 
on the size of reserve forces to deal with unanticipated emergency situ-
ations: In order to have an adequate reserve, it is asserted, all public 
welfare employees should be fit enough to respond to an unexpected 
event.92 However, although a public safety organization must be 
90. The St. Paul court failed to confront this difficult public safety question. The court an-
swered concerns about the older district chiefs' physical ability to handle demanding aspects of 
their positions by stating that (1) a district chief engages in physically strenuous activities for 
only short periods of time, and (2) a court is able to measure a chief's ability to engage in 
strenuous activity. St. Paul, 671 F.2d at 1168. The brevity of the chief's responsibility does not 
sufficiently quell safety concerns because during these short, infrequent periods of strenuous ac-
tivity the chief's inability to perform may cost lives. The St. Paul SWAT team analogy, 671 F.2d 
at 1166, quoted in text at note 36 supra (dispatchers need not be fit to serve on a SWAT team), 
misses the point because a dispatcher is not required to engage in physically strenuous activity at 
any time. A district chief could be called upon to engage in a task similar to what a SWAT team 
member would do. Even if a district chief's duties include only infrequent strenuous physical 
activity, then the chief cannot fully meet the demands of his position if he is too old to withstand 
those episodes. 
The court's second answer is even more problematic. The district court found that the city 
failed to show either that the district chief was unable to perform the duties of his job, or that it 
was impractical to determine whether he was unable to perform the duties of his job. The court 
did find that the city made that showing for captains and firefighters. St. Paul, 500 F. Supp. at 
1141-42 (finding of fact number 42). The court implicitly states that characteristics other than 
age that preclude safe performance of physically strenuous tasks cannot be ascertained in 
firefighters and captains, but can be ascertained in district chiefs. The court must have believed 
that the occasional strenuous physical activity performed by district chiefs is of a different quality 
than that performed by the firefighters and captains. 500 F. Supp. at 1139 ("District Chiefs are 
expected to, and do, perform less demanding work than Captains and Firefighters."). 
91. Employers can show that employees' duties involve a small chance of strenuous activity 
by refining job descriptions and duties. Cf Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419. See note 88 supra and 
accompanying text. 
92. Cf Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 39 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); 
EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980). 
In EEOC v. City of East Providence, 798 F.2d 524 (1st Cir. 1986), the court upheld a 
mandatory retirement age of 60 because the City had made a sufficient showing to support a 
BFOQ defense despite the City's practice of permitting retired officers to 
work part time for the police force on an on-call basis. . . . Although there was expert 
testimony at trial that a retired special officer could be called upon to perform the same 
duties as a regular police officer, the two officers who testified that they had accepted such 
employment stated that their only assignments as retired special officers had consisted of 
directing traffic .•.. 
798 F.2d at 531. 
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somewhat flexible, it need not have interchangeable personnel. Litera-
ture on police administration does not stress the interchangeability of 
paramilitary organizations that Mahoney indicated was so impor-
tant.93 The realities of modem police and fire protection require, in-
stead, increased specialization in highly technical areas.94 
A requirement that all specialists be fit for physically strenuous 
duties is not reasonably necessary to fulfill the safety goal and is dis-
criminatory. For the unpredictable disasters that may require a great 
amount of physical resources, a reserve system of able-bodied men and 
women may meet the need. To force each specialist and supervisor 
within police and fire units to meet age requirements that are only 
BFOQ's for front-line emergency work does not buttress a bulwark for 
the public welfare. In fact, public safety is enhanced by allowing ex-
perienced and committed employees to serve in their positions longer. 
Any management problems inherent in a personnel structure in which 
older, more experienced specialists and supervisors cannot be substi-
tuted for other personnel are small compared to the benefits of the 
increased talents of the overall team.95 For instance, in times of disas-
ter, a telecommunication hub is crucial to save lives and property. 
Massachusetts may well be better off with the experienced Sgt. Maho-
ney running the hub than with a younger officer who would be able to 
perform more strenuous physical tasks.96 Public safety does not re-
quire employees to possess abilities that they will not be called on to 
use. 
93. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38-39; see also M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREETS (1981); 0. 
WILSON & R. MCLAREN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1972). Political scientist Michael K. 
Brown notes that: 
[M]any observers of the police are fond of citing the quasi-military characteristics of 
police bureaucracies as the most notable feature of contemporary departments, and police 
administrators frequently attest to the superiority of this form of organization. Yet the 
analogy between police departments and the military, despite its appeal, is quite misleading. 
A quasi-military structure is not really suited to the requirements of the police task nor is it 
completely descriptive of the actual structure of a police department. 
M. BROWN, WORKING THE STREETS 87 (1981). The American Bar Association's Standing 
Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice has written the following standard for 
police department organization: 
More flexible organizational arrangements should be substituted for the semimilitary, 
monolithic form of organization of the police agency. Police administrators should experi-
ment with a variety of organizational schemes, including those calling for substantial decen-
tralization of police operations, the development of varying degrees of expertise in police 
officers so that specialized skills can be brought to bear on selected problems, and the sub-
stantial use of various forms of civilian professional assistance at the staff level. 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Standard 1-7.7 (1986). 
94. See 0. WILSON & R. McLAREN, supra note 93, at 81-86 for a discussion of specialization 
in police administration. 
95. Special operational problems such as riots are often handled by specially trained task 
forces. 0. WILSON & R. McLAREN, supra note 93, at 436-37. 
96. See note 42 supra and accompanying text. 
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E. Other Policy Considerations 
Simplicity is a virtue, and the narrow and simple analysis in which 
courts examine the duties of each individual employee is easiest for 
courts to apply. The Janesville and Mahoney standards rely on cate-
gorizations that force courts to define such elusive concepts as the "ge-
neric class" of employees or the "vocations" within a business.97 The 
opinions in these cases are rife with discussion of the definitions of 
these categories. 98 By concentrating on rules for categories, instead of 
analyses of basic principles, courts lose sight of the fulcrum where 
Congress intended the public interest in safety to balance the em-
ployee's statutory right to be free from stereotyping and discrimina-
tion. An analysis of each individual's job description avoids 
intermediate categorizations. 
The narrower definition of "duties of the job" is clearly defined -
a court must determine what it is that the plaintiff does in his job.99 
When the inquiry is expanded to include various categories of jobs, it 
enters a gray area. The Janesville court, for example, defined the busi-
ness as the police department without discussing why it made this 
choice. The absence of any logical limits to the definition may lead to 
absurd results. Another court may just as well define the business as 
that of a municipality, thus drastically altering the definition of the 
"duties of the job." 
Another concern is that an individualized analysis will allow fewer 
employees to fall within the BFOQ exception, making it increasingly 
difficult for states and municipalities to manage their public safety 
agencies. 100 As certain specialities are freed from mandatory retire-
ment rules, they may become more popular. For instance, if Sgt. Ma-
honey had won his suit, the telecommunication assignment might have 
become more attractive to his fellow sergeants seeking to avoid the 
mandatory retirement age. Any management problems this might 
cause101 could be mitigated by increasing job incentives for strenuous 
assignments to compensate officers who will be forced to retire. 102 
97. Janesville, 630 F.2d at 1258; Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 39. 
98. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38-39 (defining "occupation" and "vocation"); Janesville, 630 F.2d 
at 1258 (defining "business" and "position"). 
99. See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the problem of incorpo-
rating a small likelihood of physically strenuous duties into a job description. 
100. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38. 
101. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38. 
102. A concern with any standard is that it will let loose a flood oflitigation as employees sue 
to keep their jobs. See Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 38. The proposed narrow analysis may seem at first 
to encourage litigation because it considers each plaintiff's individual situation, while with a 
broad Janesville standard, a single ruling on the BFOQ issue might settle many plaintiffs' claims. 
Also, the narrow analysis would allow fewer BFOQ exceptions. In a regime with many BFOQ 
exceptions, plaintiffs would sue less frequently because they would have less chance of winning. 
However, once the initial wave of cases is decided, the particularized analysis is not likely to 
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CONCLUSION 
The ADEA stands for the principle that employment decisions 
must be based on ability rather than on age stereotypes. In situations 
in which public safety is at stake and an employer cannot determine an 
employee's fitness through individual testing, the law has carved out a 
narrow exception to this principle. Although the Supreme Court has 
adopted a test to determine when the narrow BFOQ exception is satis-
fied, there are conflicting theories about what group of employees' job 
duties a court must examine when applying the test. 
An analysis of an employee's particular activities is the proper 
scope of examination to determine what constitutes the "duties of the 
job" in the context of the Tamiami test adopted in Criswell. To ex-
pand the scope of examination is to ignore Congress' underlying goal 
in passing the ADEA to protect the employees from categorizations 
that do not reflect either their individual abilities or the demands on 
those abilities. 
The statutory history of the ADEA suggests a narrow scope for 
the BFOQ defense. Serious problems arise in applying the narrow 
scope to job responsibilities that entail a small probability that strenu-
ous work will be done. In order to maintain organizational flexibility 
for emergency responses, the scope must be wide enough to permit 
employers to show, through job descriptions and prior practice, that 
such small likelihoods actually occur. Public safety is served by set-
ting high standards for the individual to meet, and not by stereotyping 
employees by age or classifying them by their occupational allegiance. 
The 1986 ADEA amendments require the EEOC and the Department 
of Labor to study tests which may determine the ability and compe-
tency of individuals to carry out certain strenuous public safety 
activities. 103 
Our judicial process is designed to resolve disputes between two 
parties. As a result, when courts are asked to adjudicate the rights of a 
discrete class, such as the elderly, the court focuses on a single, named 
plaintiff. By concentrating on justice for the individual rather than 
broad policymaking for the class, courts may remedy discrimination 
and avoid creating new stereotypes to be applied across a large group 
of people. The right of older Americans to work is ensured by the 
consistent application of the ADEA antidiscrimination principles to 
each employee who complains of age stereotyping. To enhance the 
fairness of its decisions, the judicial system must tailor a scope of anal-
ysis that complements its ability to apply antidiscrimination standards. 
The examination of the particular duties of the job of the individual 
generate more suits than the other analyses. The faster the law stabilizes and becomes predict· 
able, the less litigation will arise. 
103. See note 10 supra. 
November 1986] Note - BFOQ Defense in ADEA Suits 351 
employee, rather than of a class of employees, creates such a comple-
mentary system. 
- Robert L. Fischman 
